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Abstract
Grid users and their jobs need credentials to access 
grid resources and services. It is important to minimize 
the exposure of credentials to adversaries. A practical 
solution is needed that works with existing software 
and is easy to deploy, administer, and maintain. Thus, 
credential management services are the wave of the 
future for virtual organizations such as Grid 
computing. This paper describes architecture of a 
scalable, secure and reliable on-line credential 
management service called SafeBox for InterGrid 
computing platform. SafeBox provides InterGrid users 
with secure mechanism for storing one or multiple 
credentials and access them based on need at anytime 
from anywhere. 
Keywords: Grid computing, credential management, 
authentication, authorization, InterGrid Computing, 
Secuirty. 
1. Introduction 
InterGrid computing is a computing platform 
that conglomerates independently managed Grid 
Services that possibly vary with regard to the type 
of credentials used to prove user identity (e.g., 
username/password, X.509, Kerberos, etc.) [1]. 
However, the security needs of different InterGrid 
systems vary widely and the authentication 
mechanisms are similarly diverse. This means, an 
end-user can potentially have multiple and diverse 
credentials to access grid resources and services.
Accommodating a diversity of security systems 
across multiple domains remains a fundamental 
challenge [2]. Also, the security of a system is 
often depends on how securely user credentials 
are managed. Moreover, as grid computing is 
moving from research into commercial arena, 
resource owners may require guarantees as to the 
level of protection user credentials are afforded 
[8]. Moreover, a credential management service 
with capability of exchanging different types of 
credentials has been identified as being critical to 
the success of the security Grid Services [2, 3, 
15]. 
In InterGrid computing platform, asking the 
end-users to manage and present credentials 
manually for each service is tedious, error-prone 
and potentially insecure [2]. Therefore, allowing 
users to manage their credentials is risky. 
Practically, users cannot be expected to obtain and 
keep track of all the associated certificates and 
private keys. Most importantly, user managed 
credentials are error-prone and can lead to 
significant security and usability problems [3]. In 
fact, most grid users are mainly interested in 
seamless and reliable access to grid resources and 
services without undue regard for the specific 
security technologies or cryptographic algorithm 
used for access control mechanisms. Since it is 
difficult for users to manage their own credentials 
[3], there is a need for tools that provide for 
secure storage, management and ubiquitous 
access to credentials from anywhere at any time. 
An online credential repository can provide an 
alternative to user-managed long-term credentials. 
Such repositories can provide a well-secured 
credential storage service that allows credentials 
to be retrieved easily over the network with 
appropriate authentication. Several credential 
management systems with varying capabilities 
have been designed and developed.
MyProxy [3] uses a central server for 
credential storage thus scalability and availability 
is a problem. Moreover, centralized credential 
management raises significant security concerns 
as the central server is an attractive target. For 
instance, it is susceptible to denial of service 
attack (DoS).
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CredEx [2] is a credential exchange system. 
The users are responsible for mappings between 
the credentials they posses, which we believe is 
not a good idea. Another problem is that choosing 
the least privilege credential for a given operation 
would involve multiple calls to the service and 
would require the user to knowing which aliases 
to retrieve.
Securely Available Credentials Protocol 
(SACRED) [5] is another password-based 
credential storage and retrieval system. It doesn't 
perform any form of delegation and it is 
centralized repository as such it has the same 
problems as MyProxy. Also, its operation is 
transparent inside one Security/PKI/CA domain 
(i.e., doesn’t solve inter-domain use of 
credentials). Moreover, it disallows X.509 proxy 
delegation as defined in Grid Security 
Infrastructure (GSI) [9].  
In this paper, we present the architecture of an 
online grid credential management service called 
SafeBox that facilitates the secure storage of 
credentials and enables the dynamic exchange of 
different credential types. In summary, existing 
credential management tools do not scale and not 
fault-tolerant. Thus, it is unfeasible to use them in 
a production grid, with a potentially very large 
number of users (e.g. exceeding thousands of 
people). Moreover, being able to exchange 
multiple credentials is extremely important [2]. 
However, dealing with several credentials does 
require some intelligence on the part of the 
credential requester (either the user or the service 
on the user's behalf) [2]. For instance, choosing 
the least privileged credential for a given 
operation would require knowing the privilege 
levels corresponding to various credential aliases 
[2]. Similarly, obtaining a set of credentials to 
present for authentication would involve several 
calls to the service and would require knowing 
which particular credentials to retrieve. As a 
result, most existing credential exchange services 
only support a single direction of credential 
exchange (i.e. only password for certificate, not 
the reverse), and tend to be limited to specific 
application domains (e.g., grid services) using 
proprietary protocols on a single platform [2]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 discusses the overall architecture of the 
SafeBox credential management system. Section 
3 describes the credential management policy. 
Section 4 describes the credential management 
services. Section 5 describes the credential 
replication service. Section 6 describes the 
accounting and auditing service. Section 7 
discusses the credential exchange service of the 
SafeBox in detail. The conclusions and future 
directions are discussed in Section 8. 
2. SafeBox Architecture 
SafeBox allows long-term credentials to be 
stored in a trusted server from which certificates 
can be obtained by providing a password. A 
SafeBox server is typically run by Grid 
administrators on a well-secured machine, to 
provide maximum protection for the stored 
credentials.
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 Fig. 1: SafeBox Architecture 
Fig. 1 shows an overview of the SafeBox 
credential management system architecture and 
how it interacts with various components of the 
Grids. The main goal of SafeBox is to get 
credential management out of end users hands 
while enable users to have access to them from 
anywhere at anytime. SafeBox stores encrypted 
credentials and access policy in an online 
repository and make it available to users on 
demand with appropriate authentication at 
anytime from anywhere. There are no long-term 
credentials for the user to manage in this case, so 
there are no private keys stored on potentially 
insecure end-user devices such as laptops.
In addition, SafeBox can perform single sign-
on as well as credential delegation and provides 
auditing and accountability of credential use. 
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SafeBox could be deployed to manage the 
credentials of a single user, a small group within a 
single organization, or a large collaborative group 
that spans organizations. The model supported by 
SafeBox has advantages for the mobile user but 
requires very careful management of the server. 
 As shown in Fig. 1, SafeBox consists of five 
main components: (i) authentication service; (ii) 
credential management services (CMS); (iii) 
credential replication service (CRS); (iv) Audit 
service, and (v) credential exchange service 
(CES). These components collectively allow Grid 
users to securely store and manage multiple sets 
of different type credentials; allow them the 
flexibility to conveniently use grid services and 
provide flexible authentication to a wide range of 
systems even when away from their desktop.  
In the following subsections, we will briefly 
explain each of these components. 
3. Credential Management Policy 
Access to SafeBox is governed by a server-side 
and client-side policies. Server-wide policies 
allow the SafeBox administrator to control how 
the SafeBox may be used. Client-side policies 
allow users to specify how each credential may be 
accessed (e.g. credential renewal policy).  
A SafeBox server is located at each site or a 
group of sites can have one SafeBox server. Users 
run SafeBox client software. All communication 
between SafeBox clients and SafeBox servers is 
encrypted via the SSL protocol [6]. The server-
side policy governs issues such as if the third 
party could upload new credentials, delete 
credential, ask for extension of credential lifetime, 
etc. The policy also determines who has access to 
view and modify the logs. 
The default credential is the same from which 
the user initiates the request. In case there are 
multiple credentials used in the initiating site, the 
most often used credentials will be used as default 
credential. The credential exchange service can be 
invoked either by the user or the services.  
4. Credential Management Service 
SafeBox credential management service 
provides users with mechanism to store, retrieve, 
renew and revoke credentials as well as reset 
passwords. These operations are performed only 
after the client and server mutually authenticated 
each other. The authentication information in this 
process consists of a user identity and a pass 
phrase to be used to authenticate any later 
retrieval operations. 
Each client of a SafeBox could own a safe box 
of a certain size. The safe box could expand or 
shrink dynamically based on the number of 
credentials stored in it. Each user controls the safe 
box under his or her username and initial 
password.
SafeBox allows users to store multiple 
credentials they own in their personal safe box. 
Credentials can be uploaded by the user to their 
own safe box. Each credential uploaded on 
SafeBox server has associated service name (e.g., 
Gmail). By allowing the end-users to give a 
service name to the stored credentials, the users 
gains the ability to store multiple different 
credentials which can be selectively retrieved on-
demand at anytime from anywhere.  
The credentials may be stored encrypted with 
the user's passphrase in the repository, so a 
compromise of the SafeBox server would not 
immediately compromise all user keys; an 
additional offline attack on the keys would be 
required. Both the user identity and pass phrase 
are chosen by the user, but can be tested by the 
SafeBox to ensure that they meet any local policy 
(e.g. the pass phrase must be a certain length, etc.). 
Once credentials are stored in a SafeBox, 
clients can query the server for the credentials 
they have stored and retrieve specific credentials 
by name. Users could also retrieve a proxy-
credential. A proxy credential is a short-term 
credential that is created by a user, which can be 
used in place of the long-term credential to 
authenticate that user. The proxy credential has its 
own private key and certificate, and is signed 
using the user's long-term credential. Last but not 
least, SafeBox supports automatic negotiation of 
required credentials to allow applications to 
retrieve the needed credentials as well as notify 
the user that a needed credential is unavailable. 
SafeBox securely stores the user's credentials 
and generates proxy credentials for the user via 
delegation when requested. The retrieval 
restrictions are currently limited to a maximum 
lifetime for proxy credentials that the repository 
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may delegate on the user's behalf. The credentials 
delegated to the repository normally have a 
lifetime of a week. The user can change this to 
any length of time desired. The user can also, at 
any point, destroy any credentials they previously 
delegated to the repository. 
When a user wishes to retrieve a stored 
credential, a username-password pair (established 
during storage) and challenge-response is used to 
authenticate the request and if successful the 
required credential would then be exchanged for a 
proxy certificate. A user could also retrieve 
multiple credentials in a single request (especially 
when more than two tokens are required). This 
capability reduces the number of request 
messages as such can greatly improve efficiency.  
5. Fault-tolerance Service 
In contrast to a locally stored private key, a 
remote credential service is vulnerable to network 
and server outages. If the server is unavailable, 
users will either resort to other, potentially less 
secure, credential access mechanisms or be denied 
access to grid services. Therefore, fault-tolerance 
is an important property of any credential 
management service. 
SafeBox provides fault-tolerance by replicating 
credentials over multiple SafeBox in different 
sites. The client machine can also be an option 
provided that it has tools such as Java Keystore 
[10]. Replication of credentials is optional and the 
user decided whether or not his/her credential is 
replicated. Also, the user is informed the 
secondary location of the credentials if replication 
is allowed.
6. Audit Service 
The main goal of auditing service is to 
effectively report on user accesses and how 
credentials are used.  The audit service is 
responsible for producing records, which track 
security relevant events. The auditing service 
captures information regarding how credentials 
were used within the Grid. It registers in the 
activity log all operations, which include 
information about the time and source (e.g., IP 
address) of the operation, the claimed identity of 
the client, the type and result of the operation and 
possibly other operation specific information.  
The resulting audit records may be examined 
as to determine if the desired security policy is 
being enforced as well as adherence to the stated 
access control and authentication policies. Audit 
trails establish which identities were active and 
what access they had at what time. SafeBox 
digitally signs logs so that some level of assurance 
can be provided that they have not been tampered 
with.
Fig. 2: Credential exchange protocol 
7. Credential Exchange Service 
Authentication mechanisms employed by Grid 
sites vary with regard to the type of security 
credentials used to prove user identity. SafeBox's 
credential translation service (CES) is an inter-
domain credential manager. It provides credential 
translation facility between one type of credential 
to another type or form of credential.  
In light of the InterGrid computing, being able 
to exchange multiple credentials in a flexible way 
is paramount. Fig. 2 demonstrates how CES 
provides automatic and flexible credential 
exchange services. In the scenario of Fig. 2, the 
SafeBox clients simply submit a job execution 
request along the default credentials to the Grid 
Resource Broker (GRB), which in turn recruits an 
execution site for the job.
A service consumer would like to use a grid 
service discovered through the Grid Broker 
service. The consumer communicates with the 
SafeBox server to obtain a security token. After 
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authenticating the user, the SafeBox server 
generates a security token and sends it to the 
consumer, which in turn forwards the token to the 
Grid Broker service. When the client generates 
the new token in Step 2, the client is free to set the 
lifetime of this certificate to meet its needs. In this 
way, the client effectively has control over how 
long the delegated credential is stored to the 
service.
The Broker already knows the authentication 
credential needed by the Grid service. Since the 
default credential presented by the user differs 
from the execution site, GRB asks the SafeBox to 
exchange the default token with the appropriate 
credential (in the example, to the X.509 
certificate).
The SafeBox server checks the validity of the 
security token and then forewords a proxy X.509 
certificate [11] to the Broker. Proxy certificates 
are the standard authentication token used for grid 
services; however, it would not require a 
significant modification to the credential 
exchanger for it to support issuance of standard 
X.509 certificates (in which case it could function 
as a kind of online certification authority). 
Finally, the Broker will send the service request 
from the customer along the proxy certificate to 
the Grid service. The SafeBox server records all 
interactions in an audit database. The GRB then 
submits the job along the proxy certificate to the 
execution site for execution. 
At this point, we wish to highlight some of the 
salient differences between the SafeBox credential 
exchange service described in this section with 
the CredEx [2]. SafeBox stores long-term user 
credentials and generates a proxy certificate each 
time a request from authorised user is received. 
This makes sure that the long-term credential will 
not be easily compromised. In contrast, the X.509 
certificates stored and retrieved in CredEx are the 
X.509 proxy certificates [11]. This means, users 
must manage their long-term credentials or have 
another tool such as MyProxy [3] to manage it for 
them. Note also that CredEx have focused on 
identity certificates for use in authentication; it's 
not clear if or how exchanges involving attribute 
certificates might work.  
In addition, the user in SafeBox does not really 
need to remember the type of the credentials to be 
exchanged as in CredEx. Instead, the user will 
either ask for a security token (default) or provide 
to the SafeBox server the service name (e.g., 
gmail) to retrieve the needed credential (e.g., 
username-password pair). In contrast, CredEx 
expects users to store and manage their credentials. 
Last but not least, the resources in Grids are 
acquired and released continuously at different 
sites so it is not possible for a user to be involved 
in all such transactions. Thus, user managed 
credentials can pose significant problems to 
security of the credentials and can undermine the 
security of the system. 
Not only SafeBox is capable of dynamic user-
driven or service-driven exchange of different 
credential types, a user can also accomplish single 
sign-on by acquiring a single (default) credential 
as shown in Fig. 2 and then dynamically 
exchanging that credential as needed for services 
that authenticate a different way. 
8. Conclusions and Future Directions 
This paper described a novel credential 
management system in web and grid service 
environments called SafeBox. It enables users to 
securely store multiple credentials and exchange 
different credential types transparently on 
demand. The credentials are maintained in a 
secure format by encrypting it before storage in 
SafeBox.
We are currently implementing the SafeBox 
credential management system for InterGrid 
environment. There are several issues that we 
need to add to SafeBox. For example, even 
though storing copies of multiple credential has 
it's own security problems, we are working on 
how to solve this problem. Also, SafeBox can be 
configured to allow users to logon with existing 
site credentials, using Pluggable Authentication 
Modules (PAM) and/or the Simple Authentication 
and Security Layer (SASL). Through these 
mechanisms, users are not required to remember 
another username and password for the SafeBox 
service.
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